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I. In General 
The reviewing Courts in 1969, enjoyed an open season in 
reviewing Workmen's Compensation Appeals Boardl factual 
determinations, much in the manner reported in last year's 
article. 2 The comments made by the legislature (and some 
members of the State Supreme Court) on the courts' hunting 
without a license have been to no avail. 
The legislature, for all practical purposes, was inactive in 
the field of workmen's compensation. There were important 
developments in case law, but some of the cases that may well 
work important changes in the field of workmen's compensa-
tion law are presently in various stages of appeal. 
II. Appellate Review of WeAB Decisions 
The 1969 article pointed out that in the 1967-1968 year, 
more WCAB awards had been annulled than in any similar 
period.s In that article we pointed out that in the years 1965, 
1966 and 1967, appellate review was granted in only 28 
or 29 cases per year, and that WCAB's action was overturned 
in about 16 of them. It was further pointed out that in the 
first ten months of 1968, the reviewing Courts had rendered 
decisions in 52 WCAB cases and reversed or annulled the deci-
sion of the WCAB in 42 of them. 
A look at the scoreboard4 for the period of November 1968 
through September 1969 shows 54 reported appellate deci-
sions concerning WCAB awards, 40 of which reversed or an-
nulled the action of the WCAB. 
1. Hereinafter referred to as WCAB. 
2. Goshkin, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION, Cal Law-Trends and Develop-
ments 1969, p. 99. 
3. Goshkin, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
200 
TION, Cal Law-Trends and Develop-
ments 1969, pp. 99 et seq. 
4. We use the cases reported in Cal-
ifornia Compensation Cases as a basis 
for our statistics. 
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The courts continued to use Labor Code Section 5908.5,5 
as a key to unlock the statutory doors which have prohibited 
appellate review or reweighing of factual decisions of the 
WCAB for so many years. The legislature noted this propen-
sity and one of the few legislative actions taken in workmen's 
compensation law in 1969, was to amend Labor Code Section 
5908.5, by adding the following language to that section: 
"The requirements of this section shall in no way be con-
strued so as to broaden the scope of judicial review as 
provided for in Article II (commencing with Section 
5950) of this chapter." 
In Smith v. WeAB,s Justice Burke's dissenting opinion, in 
which Justices McComb and Schauer joined, stated, in part: 
I dissent. On the factual issue, the record does not cOm-
pel the finding that the employer required the deceased 
employee to furnish his own car. Instead, the majority 
opinion has reweighed the evidence, attempting to fltC-
oncile the testimony which conflicts with the 'conclu-
sion' it announces, and has usurped the role of fact-finder 
contrary to the fundamental rules governing the func-
tions of this Court. 
The admonitions by the legislature and the dissenting opin-
ion of the three members of the Supreme Court in the Smith 
case will probably have little real effect on the Court's con-
tinued activity in reviewing WCAB factual determinations. 
However, in considering the decisions of the reviewing Courts 
on WCAB matters for the eleven months between November 
5. All sections referred to are from 
the Labor Code, unless otherwise in-
dicated. 
Lab. Code Section 5908.5 states: 
"Any decision of the appeals board 
granting or denying a petition for re-
consideration or affirming, rescinding, 
altering, or amending the original find-
ings, order, decision, or award follow-
ing reconsideration shall be made by 
the appeals board and not by a refer-
ee and shall be in writing, signed by a 
CAL LAW 1970 
majority of the appeals board members 
assigned thereto, and shall state the evi-
dence relied upon and specify in detail 
the reasons for the decision. The re-
quirements of this section shall in no 
way be construed so as to broaden the 
scope of judicial review as provided for 
in Article 2 (commencing with Section 
5950) of this chapter." 
6. 69 CaI.2d 814, 826, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
253, 261, 447 P.2d 365, 373, 33 C.c.c. 
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1968 through September 1969, the time period used as the 
basis for this article, the author did note that in July, August, 
and September of 1969, only two appellate decisions on 
WCAB matters were reported, in contrast to a five-or-six-
decision-per-month average for the prior 18 months. Inciden-
tally, both of those appellate decisions annulled the WCAB 
decisions. It is doubtful that this lull in appellate activity in 
WCAB matters signals a trend. 
III. Course and Scope of Employment 
This section might well be entitled "Where Has the Going 
and Coming Rule Gone?" In a series of decisions that cul-
minated with Smith v. WCAB,7 a very large number of em-
ployees have been granted the protection under workmen's 
compensation insurance from the time they leave their homes 
in the morning until they return to their homes at night. 
Under the well-established "going and coming rule," em-
ployees are not considered to be in the course and scope of 
their employment when they are traveling to and from work. 
Over the years, a number of exceptions have been made to this 
rule, the main exceptions being: ( 1) where the employer 
defrays the costs of the travel to and from work, (2) where 
the employee is on some special errand for the employer, and 
( 3) the "commercial traveler" exception, applied to salesmen 
who do not report to a certain office at a specified time every 
morning to begin their employment, but leave their homes and 
travel directly to various customers' locations. Despite the 
many exceptions, the going and coming rule was still con-
sidered applicable to employees who reported to a specified 
location each morning at a certain time to begin their work. 
Such employees were not considered to enter the course and 
scope of their employment until they reported to their place of 
work. 
It was the WCAB, not the courts, who caused the first crack 
in the going and coming rule. In Greyhound Bus Company 
7. 69 Cal.2d 814, 73 Cal. Rptr. 253, 
447 P.2d 365, 33 c.C.C. 771. 
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v. WCAR,s the WCAB held that a bus driver, dressed in uni-
form and carrying a case of equipment, who was killed by a 
car as he walked along the edge of a freeway to catch a bus 
he had flagged down, was within the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of his death. The employer bus com-
pany provided its driver with a free pass and there is no doubt 
that the driver would have been considered in the course and 
scope of his employment under all of the old decisions, once 
he had boarded the bus. It was the contention of the appeals 
board in its answer to the bus company's petition for a writ 
(which was denied), that the bus driver was within the field 
of risk created by his employment once he reached a bus stop. 
Under that theory, even if the employer's bus had not reached 
the bus stop, as it in fact had in this case, any injury or acci-
dent occurring to a bus driver waiting at a bus stop would be 
compensable. 
In Le Febvre v. WCAR,9 the State Supreme Court annulled 
a decision of the WCAB which held that a volunteer fireman 
was not within the course and scope of his employment while 
he was driving to a predetermined location to attend an eve-
ning fire drill. The Supreme Court stated that the volunteer 
fireman did not fall within the going and coming rule because 
his employment could not be viewed as having a headquarters 
or office where he was required to report regularly in order to 
perform his duties or before setting out on his assigned tasks. 
The Court felt that from the moment he left his home, or any 
other point from which he might have been summoned, to en-
gage in fire fighting or in training drills, he was within the 
scope of his employment. The Le Febvre case is not astonish-
ing, as it merely represents a case of the Supreme Court view-
ing facts differently from the WCAB. From the view of the 
facts taken by the Supreme Court, the fireman would fall with-
in the commercial traveler exception to the going and coming 
rule. The Le Febvre case is of interest since the Court did not 
seem concerned that, at the time of his death, the decedent was 
to report to a predetermined place. 
8. 33 C.C.C. 611 (1968). 
CAL LAW 1970 
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The Court of Appeal in Joyner v. WCAB 10 annulled a de-
cision of the WCAB which denied benefits to an employee of 
a heating and air conditioning plant injured en route home 
from work, driving his own truck but carrying some of his em-
ployer's tools and equipment. It was the normal practice of 
the applicant to report to the shop of the employer each morn-
ing before going out on a job. He sometimes, however, went 
from his home directly to a job site and sometimes went di-
rectly from a job site to his home after his day's work was 
done. He would leave all of his equipment, supplied by his 
employer, on his truck and lock the truck in his garage at 
night. He sometimes used the truck as a camper for personal 
use. He had no business sign on his truck and it was not used 
to advertise his employer's business. 
The referee denied the applicant compensation on the 
ground that he was not acting in the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of his accident. The applicant pe-
titioned for reconsideration and the WCAB denied compensa-
bility as had the referee. The Court of Appeal granted a 
hearing, and, after reviewing and reweighing the evidence,11 
reversed the WCAB and granted compensation. The Court 
felt that the employer could not have contemplated that the 
applicant would leave his truck and its contents on the job 
site when it came time to quit, and, therefore, the only reason-
able inference that could be drawn from the applicant's use 
and care of his truck and its contents was that the employer-
employee relationship continued. The conclusion was that 
the employee was performing a service to his employer by the 
transportation of his employer's tools, even while traveling 
from the job site to his home after his day's work was com-
pleted. 
10. 266 Cal. App.2d 470, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 132, 33 C.C.C. 667 (1968). 
11. The Court states: "The question 
is whether the evidence shows an agree-
ment that the employment relationship 
continue during the journey." 266 Cal. 
App.2d 470, 474, 72 Cal. Rptr. 132, 
135, 33 C.C.C. 667, 670. The Court 
clearly believed it was dealing with a 
204 
factual question. The Court set forth 
evidence that would support WCAB's 
decision, but drew different inferences 
from it. If the Court were regularly 
pursuing its limited appellate authority 
in WCAB cases, the fact that it found 
any evidence in support of the WCAB 
decision would require the Court to 
affirm the award of the WCAB. 
CAL LAW 1970 
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In Whaley v. WCAB/2 the Court of Appeal annulled a de-
cision of the WCAB which had denied compensation benefits 
to the widow of the supervisor of a newspaper delivery crew 
who was killed while driving his own automobile to work. 
The undisputed facts were that the decedent worked a 40-hour 
week, beginning each day at 2:30 a. m., when he went to the 
plant to pick up the day's papers, and ending when the morn-
ing deliveries were over, usually between 10:00 and 11 :30 
a. m. It was undisputed that the newspaper did not direct the 
decedent's travel nor was the decedent subject to the control 
of his employer in the use of his car, except as to a restriction 
against transporting unauthorized passengers during the time 
he was performing his duties. In overturning the WCAB, the 
Court reasoned that the availability and use of the decedent's 
car was a part of the service rendered to the employer. There-
fore, the employment relationship was in effect while the em-
ployee was driving the car, used in performance of his duties, 
to his place of employment. The Court cited the Joyner and 
Le Febvre cases as its authority. 
Finally, in Smith v. WCAB/3 a majority of the State Su-
preme Court created a new exception to the going and coming 
rule. The Smith case is interesting not only because it 
changed a long-established rule of law, but also because, be-
fore a majority of the Court could get to the point of over-
ruling the old controlling case, it had to review and reevaluate 
the facts, an activity from which it is precluded by statute. 
Smith was a social worker who was killed while en route 
to work in his personal car. There was conflicting evidence as 
to whether social workers were required to furnish their own 
cars or could use state cars. The WCAB denied the widow's 
petition for death benefits on the ground that the decedent was 
within the going and coming rule and therefore not in the 
course and scope of his employment at the time of his death. 
The WCAB apparently did not go deeply into the question of 
whether the employer required Smith to use his own car in 
discharging his duties, as that would not have been a material 
12. 267 Cal. App.2d 754, 73 Cal. 13. 69 Cal.2d 814, 73 Cal. Rptr. 253, 
Rptr. 348, 33 C.C.C. 743 (1968). 447 P.2d 365, 33 C.c.c. 771 (1968). 
CAL LAW 1970 205 
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issue at the time the WCAB heard the case. It only became 
material after the Supreme Court, on review of Smith, changed 
the rule of law that had existed for 34 years. 
The old rule was established in Postal Telegraph v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission. l4 In that case, the Postal Tele-
graph Company had required its messengers to furnish their 
own motorcycles. A messenger driving to work on his motor-
cycle, which he would use to discharge his duties through the 
day, was injured and applied for workmen's compensation 
benefits. The then Industrial Accident Commission awarded 
compensation to the messenger and, following a hearing in the 
Supreme Court, the award was affirmed. However, rehearing 
was granted and the decision was reversed and recovery de-
nied. From that time, the rule has been that even though the 
employer requires that an employee furnish his own car to 
discharge his duties, injuries suffered by the employee while 
en route to a fixed place of employment to which he must re-
port before starting his day's work are not compensable. 
Therefore, in its decision, the WCAB did not devote too much 
of its attention to the question of whether Smith's employer 
required Smith to provide his own vehicle. On appeal, the 
WCAB did assert that there was substantial evidence to sup-
port its conclusion that Smith was not required to furnish his 
own car. 
A four-justice majority of the Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Tobriner, was more impressed with the evidence that 
would support the conclusion that Smith was required to fur-
nish his car than with the evidence that he could have used a 
state car if he had wished. The majority overlooked the statu-
tory prohibitions forbidding their reevaluating the evidence, 
and concluded that Smith's employer did require him to fur-
nish his own car. The Court then attacked the Postal T ele-
graph decision, and found that it had lost its "vitality," as its 
decisional foundations have been "eroded" over the years. 
The majority decision appears to offer a new rule of law, that 
is, that where the employee's use of his own car in perform-
14. 1 Cal.2d 730, 37 P.2d 441, 96 2d 814, 73 Cal. Rptr. 253, 447 P.2d 
A.L.R. 460 (1934) overruled in 69 Cal. 365. 
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ing his duties is permitted by the employer, and such use can 
be said to be of some benefit to the employer, the employee is 
within the course and scope of his employment while he is 
driving from his home to his place of employment in the morn-
ing and when he is going from his place of employment to his 
home in the evening. 
Smith's death occurred on one of his "office days," during 
which it was not contemplated that he would have to leave the 
office and make calls. Le Febvre's death occurred while he 
was en route to a fixed place where some fire drills were to be 
held, and it was not contemplated that he would have to re-
spond to fire calls. Whaley's death occurred while he was en 
route to a fixed place, the newspaper plant, where he had to 
pick up his newspapers before distributing them to newsboys. 
Therefore, even though it has not been directly stated by the 
courts, it appears that where an employee uses his automobile 
to perform his duties, he is in the course of his employment 
driving to and from work even on those days where it is not 
contemplated that he will be using his automobile to perform 
his duties. 
The minority opinion in Smith decried both the majority's 
reweighing and reevaluating the evidence and its overturning 
of the Postal Telegraph decision. It was a four-to-three deci-
SIOn. 
IV. Penalties 
Perhaps the decision which will have the most far-reaching 
effect on the administration of workmen's compensation 
claims is Berry v. WCAB.15 While the question in the Berry 
case was whether the workmen's compensation carrier should 
be assessed a penalty for unreasonable delay in payment of 
benefits, the importance of the decision is in the Court's inter-
pretation of section 4650.16 In Berry, the applicant had been 
15. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 65, 34 C.C.C. 507 (1969). 
16. Lab. Code § 4650 states: "If 
an injury causes temporary disabili-
ty, a disability payment shall be made 
CAL LAW 1970 
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the eighth day after the injured employ-
ee leaves work as a result of the in-
jury; provided, that in case the injury 
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awarded continuing temporary disability. On September 30, 
1968, the employer petitioned to terminate temporary disabil-
ity on the ground that the applicant's condition had become 
stationary and ratable as of August 21, 1968. In support of 
its petition to terminate temporary disability, the carrier filed 
a medical report in which the doctor offered his opinion that 
the employee's condition was permanent and stationary and 
that he had a residual disability which was due, at least in part, 
to the industrial injury. The carrier stopped payments of tem-
porary disability with its filing of the petition to terminate its 
liability. The applicant objected to the termination of his tem-
porary disability and asserted that his condition was still tem-
porary. He also requested an assessment of a penalty for 
unreasonable delay if the carrier failed to make advances 
against his permanent disability. The carrier did not make 
such advances. After a hearing, the referee determined that 
the applicant's condition was permanent and stationary; that 
he suffered a 63% permanent disability, and that the employer 
had not unreasonably delayed payment. Reconsideration was 
denied and the applicant petitioned for a writ solely on the is-
sue of the WCAB's refusal to assess a penalty against the car-
rier for unreasonable delay because of its refusal to advance 
payments against his permanent disability award. The Court 
granted the writ, annulled the order of the WCAB, and direct-
ed it to enter a new award allowing a penalty for late pay-
ment. 
The WCAB had adopted the referee's opinion that it was 
not unreasonable for the carrier to stop temporary disability 
payments and to await determination of its liability before 
beginning permanent disability payments. In its answer to 
the employee's petition for a writ, the WCAB argued that it 
would be unreasonable to require an employer or insurance 
carrier to make advances of permanent disability prior to a 
or necessitates hospitalization the dis-
ability payment shall be made from the 
first day the injured employee leaves 
work or is hospitalized as a result of the 
injury. If the injury causes permanent 
disability, a disability payment shall be 
208 
made for one week in advance as wages 
on the eighth day after the injury be-
comes permanent or the date of the last 
payment for temporary disability which-
ever date first occurs." 
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hearing and rating by the WCAB. The Court noted that the 
WCAB was arguing, in effect, that permanent disability need 
not be paid, under any circumstances, until after the issuance 
of an award. The WCAB cited no authority for that rule and 
the Court did not believe that section 4650, suggested such a 
rule. The Court further pointed out that such an interpre-
tation would be contrary to the provisions of section 5814,17 
which states, in pertinent part, "when payment of compensa-
tion has been unreasonably delayed or refused, either prior to 
or subsequent to the issuance of an award, the full amount of 
the order, decision or award shall be increased 10%" (em-
phasis added). The Court thought that section 5 814, indi-
cated that the carrier was not entitled to await a formal de-
termination of its liability through the issuance of a 
permanent disability award unless the carrier could show rea-
sonable cause for delay. The Court stated that the employer 
should be required to give a satisfactory excuse for delaying 
payments of permanent disability for more than 7 days after 
the time temporary disability payments stop. If, however, the 
injured employee's condition becomes permanent and station-
ary, and there is a genuine doubt, from a medical or legal 
standpoint, as to liability for benefits, delay is excused. In the 
Court's opinion, an employee's failure to make a specific re-
quest for advances or payments of his yet undetermined per-
manent disability, or failure to demonstrate urgent need for 
such payments, would not be sufficient reason to excuse 
prompt payment by the carrier. 
As a matter of practice, no workmen's compensation in-
surance carrier has regularly begun payments of permanent 
disability within 7 days of terminating temporary payments or 
within 7 days of the date that the employee's condition is per-
17. Lab. Code § 5814 states: 
"When payment of compensation has 
been unreasonably delayed or refused. 
either prior to or subsequent to the is-
suance of an award, the full amount 
of the order, decision or award shall be 
increased by 10 percent. The question 
of delay and the reasonableness of the 
CAL LAW 1970 
cause therefor shall be determined by 
the appeals board in accordance with 
the facts. Such delay or refusal shall 
constitute good cause under Section 
5803 to rescind, alter or amend the or-
der, decision or award for the purpose 
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manent and stationary. Many carriers, as a regular practice, 
have made "advances" against the future liability for perma-
nent disability when a request for such advances has been 
made. The Court's interpretation of the requirements of 
section 4650, has created a burdensome administrative prob-
lem for workmen's compensation insurance carriers. The 
Court apparently believes that the wording of section 4650, 
should be rigidly interpreted, and any time that temporary 
disability is stopped, for any reason, the carrier must begin 
payment of permanent disability benefits on the 8th day or be 
required to show a medical or legal doubt as to its liability 
for such payments. The most frequent basis for terminating 
temporary disability is when an employee returns to work. 
In the vast majority of industrial injuries the employee is re-
turned to work before his condition has reached a permanent 
and stationary stage. Frequently, the treating doctors want 
to give the injured employee a trial at work before determining 
what, if any, permanent residuals he will suffer from his in-
dustrial injury. Therefore, while a carrier may believe that 
it will have some liability for permanent disability at the time 
the employee returns to work and his temporary disability is 
terminated, it may be weeks or even months before the extent 
of the disability resulting from the industrial injury is known. 
In such a case, there would be no doubt that some liability for 
permanent disability would attach. The Berry decision re-
quires that payment of permanent disability begins when tem-
porary disability stops. The question facing the insurance 
carriers is "how much?" If payment of permanent disability 
is started, when can it reasonably be stopped? Would pay-
ment of a very minimal amount satisfy the Berry court's inter-
pretation of the statute? 
As the Berry decision recognizes a carrier's right to with-
hold payment of permanent disability where there is a legal 
or medical doubt as to its liability for such payment, there 
seems to be no question that a conflict in the medical opinion 
as to the existence of any disability would be a reasonable 
cause for withholding payment. However, where there is only 
a conflict in the medical opinion as to the extent of permanent 
disability resulting from the injury, the carrier has a duty to 
210 CAL LAW 1970 
12
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/8
Workmen's Compensation 
start and continue payments until it has paid off at least the 
minimum amount supported by the medical record. 
The Berry decision is going to create a problem for appli-
cants' attorneys as well as for insurance carriers. Applicants' 
attorneys fees are payable from the applicant's awarded com-
pensation, and generally are paid from accrued but unpaid 
disability benefits. Where a carrier has been paying perma-
nent disability from the time that temporary disability has 
ceased and the matter does not go to hearing for some months, 
it may well be that the carrier will have paid out its entire lia-
bility to the injured employee and there will be no monies 
available for the applicant's attorney's fee. When injured 
employees seek representation, they may have a difficult time 
obtaining the services of an attorney where they have enjoyed 
payments of permanent disability for some time. 
v. Costs 
In Caldwell v WCAB,18 the Court of Appeal overturned an 
en banc decision of the WCAB that denied an injured em-
ployee reimbursement for travel expenses and one day's tem-
porary disability reimbursement for loss of wages incident to 
the employee's traveling to see a doctor of his own choice to 
obtain a medical report on his own behalf. Due to its ap-
parent misunderstanding of the record, the Court may well 
have effected a greater change in the law than it had intended. 
The question in Caldwell is the interpretation of section 
4600.19 As may be noted in the footnotes where it is set forth 
18. 268 Cal. App.2d 912, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 517, 34 C.C.C. 37 (1969). 
19. Lab. Code § 4600 states: 
';Medical, surgical, and hospital treat-
ment, including nursing, medicines, 
medical and surgical supplies, crutches, 
and apparatus, including artificial memo 
bers, which is reasonably required 
to cure or relieve from the effects 
of the injury shall be provided 
by the employer. In the case of his 
neglect or refusal seasonably to do so, 
the employer is liable for the reason-
CAL LAW 1970 
able expense incurred by or on behalf 
of the employee in providing treatment. 
In accordance with the rules of prac-
tice and procedure of the appeals board, 
the employee, or the dependents of a 
deceased employee, shall be reimbursed 
for expenses reasonably, actually, and 
necessarily incurred for X-rays, labor-
atory fees, medical reports, and med-
ical testimony to prove a contested 
claim. The reasonableness of and ne-
cessity for incurring such expenses to 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Workmen's Compensation 
in full, section 4600, consists of three paragraphs. The third 
and final paragraph was enacted in 1959, and reads as fol-
lows: 
"Where at the request of the employer, the employer's 
insurance carrier, the administrative director, the ap-
peals board or a referee, the employee submits to exam-
ination by a physician, he shall be entitled to receive in 
addition to all other benefits herein provided all reason-
able expenses of transportation, meals and lodging in-
cident to reporting for such examination, together with 
one day of temporary disability indemnity for each day 
of wages lost in submitting to such an examination." 
Prior to 1959, there was no express provision in section 
4600, granting an employee reimbursement for travel ex-
penses and payment of one day's temporary disability for each 
day of wages lost in submitting to examinations and treatment 
requested by the employer or its compensation carrier. How-
ever, the WCAB (then Industrial Accident Commission) had 
read into the section the right of the employee to such ex-
penses, relying upon section 3202,20 which requires that the 
Labor Code be liberally construed in favor of an injured work-
man. 
In Caldwell, the WCAB took the position that, prior to the 
1959 amendment that added the third paragraph to section 
4600, in the spirit of section 3202, it might well have been able 
to interpret section 4600, to permit reimbursement of travel 
termined with respect to the time when 
such expenses were actually incurred. 
Expenses of medical testimony shall be 
presumed reasonable if in conformity 
with the fee schedule charges provided 
for impartial medical experts appointed 
by the administrative director. 
Where at the request of the employ-
er, the employer's insurance carrier, the 
administrative director, the appeals 
board or a referee, the employee sub-
mits to examination by a physician, he 
shall be entitled to receive in addition 
to all other benefits herein provided all 
212 
reasonable expenses of transportation, 
meals and lodging incident to reporting 
for such examination, together with one 
day of temporary disability indemnity 
for each day of wages lost in submit-
ting to such an examination." 
20. Lab. Code § 3202 states: 
"The provisions of Division 4 and Di-
vision 5 of this code shall be liberally 
construed by the courts with the pur-
pose of extending their benefits for the 
protection of persons injured in the 
course of their employment." 
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expenses incurred by an injured employee visiting a doctor on 
his own behalf or by his own choice. However, the WCAB 
did not feel that even under a liberal construction could it 
have granted the employee one day's temporary disability for 
each day's wage loss. The WCAB further felt that when the 
legislature specifically addressed itself to that question by the 
addition of the third paragraph in 1959, it had expressed its 
intention to grant the employee reimbursement for travel ex-
penses and one day's temporary disability for each day's loss 
of wages only where such expenses were incurred at the direc-
tion of the employer or its insurance carrier. The WCAB 
pointed out that the third paragraph started with the specific 
phrase "where at the request of the employer, ." and 
expressed its opinion that, as the words of the statute were 
clear, it was not free to alter or add to them to accomplish a 
purpose that did not appear on the face of the statute or in 
its legislative history. 
On appeal, the Court disagreed with the WCAB's interpre-
tation of the statute, and its self-restraint in not finding a way 
to construe section 4600, so as to grant the employee reim-
bursement. The Court apparently misunderstood what reim-
bursement had been granted Caldwell by the referee. The 
referee had actually reimbursed Caldwell for his travel ex-
penses and granted him one day's temporary disability to com-
pensate him for one day's loss of wages. The Court appar-
ently believed that the referee had granted reimbursement for 
travel expenses and reimbursement for the actual wages lost. 
As the maximum temporary disability at the time of the Cald-
well decision was $10 per day, it would be considerably less 
than the loss of a day's wages for most employees. 
The Court's reasoning in Caldwell is not as important as its 
conclusions. That reasoning seems to be that as the words 
of section 4600, are not clear, the admonition of section 
3202, should control and the second paragraph of section 
4600, could still be construed to grant the employee reim-
bursement for travel expenses and loss of wages when he seeks 
an examination by a doctor of his own choosing to help him 
prove a contested claim. All of this, of course, is subject to 
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the referee's right to find that such expenses were reasonably 
incurred. 
If your author properly understands the implications of the 
Caldwell decision, it means that where the employer or the 
carrier requests that the injured employee report to a doctor 
for examination or treatment, the employee must be reim-
bursed for his travel expenses and given one day's temporary 
disability for each day's wages he loses. However, where the 
employee decides to visit a doctor, on his own, for examina-
tion, the employer or carrier must reimburse him for his travel 
expenses and his actual loss of wages. This would truly seem 
to be an anomalous rule. 
VI. Payment of Benefits 
A. Waiting Period 
In Coolman v. Continental Can Co./ the WCAB, in an en 
banc opinion, settled some uncertainties as to the proper con-
struction of the first sentence of section 4650.2 Simply sum-
marized, that portion of section 4650, states that an injured em-
ployee gets no temporary disability for the first 7 days of his loss 
of time from work by reason of his injury unless the total pe-
riod of lost time exceeds 49 days or unless the injury requires 
hospitalization. Some confusion has grown up in those cases 
where the injury causes hospitalization; not on the first day of 
the injury, but at some time during the 7-day waiting period. 
If, for example, the injured employee goes to the hospital on 
the third day after leaving work, there is a question as to 
whether his temporary disability should start with that day, 
omitting only the first two, or if the compensation carrier 
should go back and pick up the first two days of lost time as 
well. The WCAB, in its en banc opinion, in Coolman, inter-
preted the section to require that temporary disability start on 
the day of hospitalization, not on the first day of lost time.2.5 
1. 34 C.C.C. 61 (1969). 2.5. Since this article was written, the 
2. Lab. Code § 4650 is set forth in Court of Appeal has overturned the 
full supra. decision in Coo/mall. The Court of 
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In Klein v. City of Los Angeles,S the WCAB, in another en 
banc opinion, decided the date on which interest would start 
running on awards where reconsideration has been granted. 
This question has been raised by several petitions for recon-
sideration. 
An injured employee's right to interest on an award of com-
pensation benefits is set forth in section 5800.4 The WCAB 
pointed out that where reconsideration is denied, the injured 
employee's rights flow from the referee's decision and interest 
should run from the date of that decision. Problems arise, 
however, where reconsideration is granted and the WCAB 
alters, amends, or annuls the decision of the referee. In a 
highly technical opinion, the WCAB decided, 6 to 1, that when 
reconsideration is granted, a referee's decision loses its vitality 
and interest on the award runs from the date of the opinion 
after reconsideration, and not from the date of the award by 
the referee. 
C. Temporary Disability 
In Herrera v. WCAR,5 the State Supreme Court issued a 
rare decision, in that it affirmed an order of the WCAB. It 
probably merits consideration for that reason alone. Actually 
the case cannot be considered a landmark case, although it 
does quiet some nagging doubts. 
Appeal decision now holds that when an 
employee is hospitalized any time dur-
ing the first 7 days, the carrier must go 
back and pay the temporary disability 
from the first day of lost work. Donald 
G. Burns v. WCAB (1969), 2 Cal. 
App.3d 542, 82 Cal. Rptr. 678, 34 Cal. 
Compo Cases 635 (hearing denied). 
3. 34 c.C.C. 247 (1969). 
4. Lab. Code § 5800 states: 
"All awards of the appeals board 
either for the payment of compensation 
or for the payment of death benefits, 
shall carry interest at the same rate as 
CAL LAW 1970 
judgments in civil actions on all due 
and unpaid payments from the date 
of the making and filing of said award. 
Such interest shall run from the date 
of making and filing of an award, as 
to amounts which by the terms of the 
award are payable forthwith. As to 
amounts which under the terms of the 
award subsequently become due in in-
stallments or otherwise, such interest 
shall run from the date when each such 
amount becomes due and payable." 
5. 71 Cal.2d 254, 78 Cal. Rptr. 497, 
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Herrera suffered an industrial injury which caused him to 
lose two months' work, but his employer continued his salary. 
After hearing, a referee granted Herrera reimbursement for 
some self-procured medical treatment and temporary disability 
in the amount of $567.92, covering his loss of work. The 
employer and its insurance carrier petitioned for reconsidera-
tion, which was granted. The WCAB, after reconsideration, 
found that the employee did sustain injury but that the injury 
had caused no compensable wage loss. In its order after re-
consideration, the WCAB granted the employee recovery only 
of his self-incurred medical treatment. Herrera appealed, con-
tending his continued wage was "a gratuity." A Court of 
Appeal annulled the WCAB decision and the Supreme Court 
granted a hearing. In its decision, the Supreme Court 
pointed out that, under section 4909, the allowance of credit 
for wage payments voluntarily made by an employer with no 
agreement as to the purpose is within the WCAB's discretion. 
Also, the WCAB was following its established policy to allow 
credit to the employer when wage payments are made to an 
employee during a period of total disability where there has 
been no agreement as to their purpose. Therefore, the 
WCAB's action in denying Herrera temporary disability ben-
efits was proper. 
The established policy of the WCAB, to deny temporary 
disability benefits to an injured employee who is paid his salary 
during his period of disability, now has Supreme Court sanc-
tion. 
VII. Subrogation 
In the 1969 article, we reported on the case of Pearce v. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,s and noted that in its en banc 
decision, the WCAB speculated that it might not have to deny 
an employer or carrier credit as to future liability in the 
amount of an injured workman's net recovery from a third-
party suit, even though the employer had been found to be 
6. Pearce v. Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Co. 33 c.c.c. 243 (1968). 
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contributorily negligent. In that case, the WCAB also specu-
lated that an employer's obligation to furnish medical treat-
ment might not be subject to a right to credit for third-party 
recovery.7 As expected, the WCAB's speculations bore fruit 
and in 1969 it was faced with the question in Nelsen v. Capitol 
Roof Structures. s 
In Nelsen, a jury in a third-party suit found Nelsen's em-
ployed contributorily negligent and reduced Nelsen's recovery 
by the amount of workmen's compensation benefits expended. 
Under the jury's determination, the workmen's compensation 
carrier's lien was denied. Nelsen applied for further work-
men's compensation benefits and the carrier claimed a credit 
in the amount of Nelsen's net civil recovery. After a hearing 
before a referee, the carrier was refused credit on the ground 
that the employer had been found contributorily negligent. 
Nelsen was awarded permanent disability and further medical 
treatment. The carrier petitioned for reconsideration, con-
tending that the referee erred in disallowing the credit in the 
amount of Nelsen's net third-party recovery, and that if its 
credit was not allowed, Nelsen would receive a double recov-
ery. 
The WCAB granted reconsideration and pointed out that 
it had dealt with some similar problems in Pearce, and that 
while its decision in Pearce had been appealed, the appellate 
proceedings had been dismissed at the request of the peti-
tioner.9 The WCAB decided that the carrier or employer is 
due credit against his future liability for workmen's compensa-
tion benefits, including medical treatment, in the net amount 
of the injured employee's third-party recovery, regardless of 
a finding of employer negligence. The rationale of the deci-
sion is that to hold otherwise would permit double recovery 
on the part of an injured employee. 
The impact of Nelsen on subrogation practices of insurance 
carriers is bound to be wide-spread. Prior to Pearce and Nel-
7. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Cal 8. 34 c.c.c. 238 (1969), 
Lall'-Trellds and Del'elopmenls 1969, 9. Petitioner requested dismissal be-
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sen, where an employer had been found to be contributorily 
negligent, not only was the workmen's compensation carrier 
denied recovery of monies expended to the date of trial, but 
it was also denied credit against future liability. Particularly 
after Pearce, carriers would frequently waive their right to a 
lien and recovery of monies expended to the date of trial, to 
help effect settlement so that no determination would be made 
as to the negligence of the employer. Where there had been 
no determination of the employer's contributory negligence, 
under Pearce, the carrier or employer would be granted credit. 
Therefore, it was to the benefit of carriers, where it appeared 
that the employer might well be held for contributory negli-
gence, to waive their lien for monies spent to help effect set-
tlement and avoid a determination of negligence, in hopes of 
offsetting further liability by way of credit. 
If the courts uphold the WCAB's decision in Nelsen, car-
riers will probably be less willing to waive or cut their liens to 
help effect settlement, since they can be assured of a credit 
in the amount of the employee's net third-party recovery as 
an offset against liability for future compensation benefits. 
The plaintiff's (injured employee's) negotiating position 
would also be changed should the court uphold the WCAB's 
decision in Nelsen. However, the considerations facing the 
employee under the rules of Nelsen are a bit more complex. 
Prior to Nelsen and Pearce, it was, in some cases, to the plain-
tiff's advantage to try a case and receive a determination of his 
employer's contributory negligence. This, under the prior 
law, would have assured him of future compensation benefits 
regardless of his third-party recovery. In cases where the 
damages were high, and the amount of compensation benefits 
paid to the time of civil trial low, and where the chances of a 
jury holding the employer contributorily negligent high, the 
plaintiff would be in a particularly good position to effect a 
double recovery. If the law in Nelsen prevails, it would be 
completely immaterial to the plaintiff whether the employer 
were found contributorily negligent. In either case, the em-
ployer or its carrier would be granted credit against future 
compensation liability in the amount of the employee's net 
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third-party recovery. In either case, the employee's civil re-
covery would be reduced by the amount of the compensation 
benefits previously paid. Only the third-party defendant and 
the employer would be concerned about whether the employer 
was contributorily negligent. The finding on that issue would 
determine whether the employer and its carrier would be 
reimbursed for the amount of compensation benefits previ-
ously paid, or whether the third-party defendant would have 
the judgment against it reduced in that amount. 
The subrogation rights of an employer or its compensation 
carrier against the injured employee's third-party recovery 
received another setback this year. The same Court that 
decided LaBorde v. McKesson RobbimP in 1968, decided 
Bennett v. Ungerll 1969. In the 1969 article, we pointed 
out that the Court, in LaBorde, felt that the prohibitions in 
sections 385912 and 3860,13 against settlement between the 
plaintiff-employee and third-party defendant, without partic-
ipation by the employer or its compensation carrier, were not 
intended to block settlement where the concurrent negligence 
of the employer had been made an issue in the litigation, and 
where settlement was carefully drawn to leave intact all the 
10. 264 Cal. App.2d 363, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 726 (1968). 
11. 272 Cal. App.2d 202, 77 Cal. 
Rptr. 326, 34 C.c.c. 295 (1969) modi-
fied in 272 Cal. App.2d -. 
12. Lab. Code § 3859 states: 
"No release or settlement of any claim 
under this chapter as to either the em-
ployee or the employer is valid without 
the written consent of both. The con-
sent of both the employer and employ-
ee filed in court in writing together 
with the approval of the court, is suffi-
cient in any action or proceeding where 
such approval is required by law." 
13. Lab. Code § 3860 states in perti-
nent part: 
"(a) No release or settlement under 
this chapter, with or without suit, is val-
id or binding as to any party thereto 
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without notice to both the employer and 
the employee, with opportunity to the 
employer to recover the amount of 
compensation he has paid or become 
obligated to pay and any special dam-
ages to which he may be entitled under 
Section 3852, and opportunity to the 
employee to recover all damages he 
has suffered and with provision for de-
termination of expenses and attorney's 
fees as herein provided. 
"( b) The entire amount of such settle-
ment, with or without suit, is subject to 
the employer's full claim for reim-
bursement for compensation he has paid 
or become obligated to pay and any 
special damages to which he may be en-
titled under Section 3852, together with 
expenses and attorney fees, if any, sub-
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rights of the employer.14 In Bennett, the same Court felt that 
a "contingent settlement" is beyond the purview of sections 
3859 and 3860. The contingency on which the settlement in 
Bennett hinged was a determination of the employer's concur-
rent negligence. There, a widow was suing a third party for 
the wrongful death of her husband who apparently was killed 
in the course and scope of his employment. The widow had 
received some $11,749.95 in workmen's compensation death 
benefits, and the workmen's compensation carrier intervened 
in her suit to recover such benefits. One of the third-party 
defendants cross-complained against the employer, and, there-
fore, the employer was both a cross-defendant and plaintiff in 
intervention. Settlement negotiations took place. The 
widow and third-party defendants reached an agreement as to 
the value of her claim apart from the compensation lien. The 
compensation carrier had agreed to cut its $11,749.95 claim 
to $7,249.95. However, the third-party defendants would pay 
no more on the compensation lien than $5,750. As agree-
ment could not be reached, the plaintiff and defendants then 
arrived at a sum satisfactory to the widow and agreed to settle, 
contingent on adjudication of the validity of the compensation 
lien. The compensation carrier's attorneys refused this offer 
and took the position that settlement had been reached be-
tween defendant and plaintiff, and, therefore, it had a right to 
impress its lien upon those monies. Since agreement as to 
the status of the case could not be reached by the parties, trial 
was resumed, and the attorney for the employer was advised 
to be ready to proceed. He chose to dismiss his complaint in 
intervention and leave the courtroom. Apparently, the attor-
ney for the compensation carrier, beset on all sides, overlooked 
the fact that his client was not only a party as a plaintiff in 
intervention, but also as a defendant via cross-complaint. 
Therefore, his dismissal of the complaint in intervention and 
departure did not remove his client from the case. Trial pro-
ceeded and it was found that the compensation carrier was 
contributorily negligent and its lien denied. On appeal by 
14. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Cal 
Law-Trends and Developments 1969, 
at p. 136. 
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the compensation carrier, the Court upheld the action of the 
trial court and, further, fined the attorneys for the compensa-
tion carrier for bringing what the Court termed a frivolous 
appeal. 
Apparently, in at least one District of the Courts of Appeal, 
the prohibitions against third-party defendants and plaintiff-
employees settling without participation by the employer or its 
compensation carrier are no longer recognized, where the con-
current negligence of the employer has been made an issue and 
the settlement between the third-party defendant and employee 
is carefully drawn to leave intact all the rights of the em-
ployer. The same is true where the settlement is made con-
tingent on the trial of the employer's contributory negligence. 
VIII. Enterprise 
The caption "Enterprise" is not a proper subhead for an 
article on workmen's compensation, but one of the 1969 cases 
was so intriguing that it should be included in this article 
and fits in no other category. 
In Wiley v. WCAB/5 the wife of an injured employee filed 
for workmen's compensation death benefits although her hus-
band had not died and, apparently, had suffered only minor in-
jury. The WCAB's order dismissing the application for death 
benefits was appealed, the potential widow contending that the 
statutes did not make the death of the employee a condition 
precedent to commencement of an action for death benefits. 
She claimed that the statutory requirement that a death benefit 
claim must be filed within 240 weeks from the date of injury 
did not require that death itself occur within that period, but 
only that the claim be filed in that period. The Court of Ap-
peal denied the widow's writ. The author feels that this poten-
tial widow's foresight and preparation merits our admiration, 
if not our support. 
15. 34 C.c.c. 486 (1969). 
* 
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